Suchergebnisse

Most researchers believe that states which are rich in natural resources are more able to maintain political stability in comparison to countries without such an access to exceptional profits. However, some rent resource autocracies are unanimously considered fragile, and their ability to extract maximum rents does not always contribute to political and economic security during price fluctuations. Based on the idea that the state's ability to extract resources imposes on it certain ob- ligations, the research question touches upon the quality of governance as a supposed core factor, which mediates the resource dependence and political security in terms of stateness and the ability to fulfil the "social contract." The latter is described as implementation of political decisions, provision of public goods and services. However, the quality of governance is substantially different in various autocratic systems. Using casestudy and descriptive statistics, the authors try to reveal the context and ascertain which factors trigger the horizon length of autocrats` political strategies during rising and falling resource prices. The authors affirm that resource dependence negatively affects political security less due to an absence of economic growth during price breaks, and more due to the struggle of political elites for the redistribution of resources, absence of disciplinary mechanisms, weak representation and accountability systems, and poor enabling environments as a basis for quality of resource management. The authors conclude that political security in autocratic resource economies is achieved through the coexistence of political will and triggers, conducive to specifying the length of the planning horizon.

Most researchers believe that states which are rich in natural resources are more able to main- tain political stability in comparison to countries without such an access to exceptional profits. However, some rent resource autocracies are unanimously considered fragile, and their ability to extract maximum rents does not always contribute to political and economic security during price fluctuations. Based on the idea that the state's ability to extract resources imposes on it certain ob- ligations, the research question touches upon the quality of governance as a supposed core factor, which mediates the resource dependence and political security in terms of stateness and the ability to fulfil the "social contract." The latter is described as implementation of political decisions, pro- vision of public goods and services. However, the quality of governance is substantially different in various autocratic systems. Using case-study and descriptive statistics, the authors try to reveal the context and ascertain which factors trigger the horizon length of autocrats` political strategies during rising and falling resource prices. The authors affirm that resource dependence negatively affects political security less due to an absence of economic growth during price breaks, and more due to the struggle of political elites for the redistribution of resources, absence of disciplinary mechanisms, weak representation and accountability systems, and poor enabling environments as a basis for quality of resource management. The authors conclude that political security in autocratic resource economies is achieved through the coexistence of political will and triggers, conducive to specifying the length of the planning horizon. ; Większość badaczy uważa, że państwa bogate w zasoby naturalne mają większą zdolność utrzymywania stabilności politycznej w porównaniu do krajów bez takiego dostępu do wyjątkowych zysków. Jednak niektóre reżimy autokratyczne oparte na rencie surowcowej są jednogłośnie uważane za niestabilne, a ich zdolność do uzyskiwania maksymalnych korzyści nie zawsze przyczynia się do bezpieczeństwa politycznego i gospodarczego podczas wahań cen. Opierając się na założeniu, że zdolność państwa do wydobywania zasobów nakłada na nie pewne obowiązki, zadano pytanie badawcze dotyczące jakości rządzenia jako domniemanego kluczowego czynnika pomiędzy zależnością od zasobów i bezpieczeństwem politycznym państwa a zdolnością do wypełniania przez nie "umowy społecznej." Tę ostatnią określa się jako realizację decyzji politycznych oraz dostarczanie dóbr publicznych i usług. Jednak jakość rządzenia jest zasadniczo różna w różnych systemach autokratycznych. Wykorzystując studium przypadku i statystyki opisowe, autorzy starają się ukazać kontekst i ustalić, które czynniki wpływają na określenie horyzontu strategii politycznych stosowanych przez autokratyczną władzę podczas wzrostu i spadku cen zasobów. Autorzy potwierdzają, że zależność od zasobów negatywnie wpływa na bezpieczeństwo polityczne w mniejszym stopniu z powodu braku wzrostu gospo- darczego podczas obniżek cen, a bardziej ze względu na walkę elit politycznych o redystrybucję zasobów, brak mechanizmów dyscyplinujących, słabą reprezentację i systemy odpowiedzialności oraz brak sprzyjających warunków będących podstawą dobrego zarządzania zasobami. Autorzy dochodzą do wniosku, że bezpieczeństwo polityczne w autokratycznych gospodarkach zasobowych osiąga się w drodze współistnienia woli politycznej i czynników wpływających na określenie długości horyzontu planowania.

Most researchers believe that states which are rich in natural resources are more able to maintain political stability in comparison to countries without such an access to exceptional profits. However, some rent resource autocracies are unanimously considered fragile, and their ability to extract maximum rents does not always contribute to political and economic security during price fluctuations. Based on the idea that the state's ability to extract resources imposes on it certain ob- ligations, the research question touches upon the quality of governance as a supposed core factor, which mediates the resource dependence and political security in terms of stateness and the ability to fulfil the "social contract." The latter is described as implementation of political decisions, provision of public goods and services. However, the quality of governance is substantially different in various autocratic systems. Using casestudy and descriptive statistics, the authors try to reveal the context and ascertain which factors trigger the horizon length of autocrats` political strategies during rising and falling resource prices. The authors affirm that resource dependence negatively affects political security less due to an absence of economic growth during price breaks, and more due to the struggle of political elites for the redistribution of resources, absence of disciplinary mechanisms, weak representation and accountability systems, and poor enabling environments as a basis for quality of resource management. The authors conclude that political security in autocratic resource economies is achieved through the coexistence of political will and triggers, conducive to specifying the length of the planning horizon. ; Większość badaczy uważa, że państwa bogate w zasoby naturalne mają większą zdolność utrzymywania stabilności politycznej w porównaniu do krajów bez takiego dostępu do wyjątkowych zysków. Jednak niektóre reżimy autokratyczne oparte na rencie surowcowej są jednogłośnie uważane za niestabilne, a ich zdolność do uzyskiwania maksymalnych korzyści nie zawsze przyczynia się do bezpieczeństwa politycznego i gospodarczego podczas wahań cen. Opierając się na założeniu, że zdolność państwa do wydobywania zasobów nakłada na nie pewne obowiązki, zadano pytanie badawcze dotyczące jakości rządzenia jako domniemanego kluczowego czynnika pomiędzy zależnością od zasobów i bezpieczeństwem politycznym państwa a zdolnością do wypełniania przez nie "umowy społecznej." Tę ostatnią określa się jako realizację decyzji politycznych oraz dostarczanie dóbr publicznych i usług. Jednak jakość rządzenia jest zasadniczo różna w różnych systemach autokratycznych. Wykorzystując studium przypadku i statystyki opisowe, autorzy starają się ukazać kontekst i ustalić, które czynniki wpływają na określenie horyzontu strategii politycznych stosowanych przez autokratyczną władzę podczas wzrostu i spadku cen zasobów. Autorzy potwierdzają, że zależność od zasobów negatywnie wpływa na bezpieczeństwo polityczne w mniejszym stopniu z powodu braku wzrostu gospo- darczego podczas obniżek cen, a bardziej ze względu na walkę elit politycznych o redystrybucję zasobów, brak mechanizmów dyscyplinujących, słabą reprezentację i systemy odpowiedzialności oraz brak sprzyjających warunków będących podstawą dobrego zarządzania zasobami. Autorzy dochodzą do wniosku, że bezpieczeństwo polityczne w autokratycznych gospodarkach zasobowych osiąga się w drodze współistnienia woli politycznej i czynników wpływających na określenie długości horyzontu planowania.

The development of information and communication technologies and computing power leads to the emergence of additional opportunities for modeling political processes. In the past decades, mathematical models have been developed mainly in a game-theoretic setting; today we witness an expanding stream of research applying agent-based (multi-agent) approach. This trend is quite natural. There have been changes in political participation and in the forms of collective interaction of individuals and groups, induced by digital technologies. Researchers have developed theoretical approaches to political participation, focusing on the network interaction and implementing the "bottom-up" logic that infers the macro-properties of the system from the characteristics and interactions of individual agents. Thus, the theoretical foundations for an agent-based modeling, most promising in its network version, have been developed. This approach, however, required a more complex description of the individual motivation and decision making in comparison to the dominant game-theoretic paradigm. One of the key points is that motivation is considered to be linked to the network position of agents, since the individual is guided by the actions of her neighbors. Thus, the course of the political process is determined not only by the properties and decisions of its participants, but also by the type of network architecture that connects them. Within this research framework, a computational experiment, assuming a controlled variation of parameters, plays a special role. Two main strategies of such an experiment are considered: the grid search and the Monte Carlo method. The prospects of agentbased modeling in its network form are related to the study of the dynamical political processes, taking into account the structures of trust and social capital, as well as the resources and mechanisms of collective action.

There is a striking opposition within the current discourse on Russia's position in the world. On the one hand, there are well-known arguments about Russia's "weak hand" (relatively small and stagnating economy, vulnerability to sanctions, technological backwardness, deteriorating demography, corruption, bad institutions, etc.). On the other hand, Russia is accused of "global revisionism", attempts to reshape and undermine the liberal world order, and Western democracy itself. There seems to be a paradox: Russia with a perceived decline of major resources of national power, exercises dramatically increased international influence. This paradox of power and/or influence is further explored. This paper introduces a new complex Index of national power. On the basis of ratings of countries authors compare the dynamics of distribution of power in the world with a focus on Russia's national power in world politics since 1995. The analysis brings evidence that the cumulative resources of Russia's power in international affairs did not increase during the last two decades. However, Russia's influence in world politics has significantly increased as demonstrated by assertive foreign policy in different parts of the world and its perception by the international political community and the public. Russia remains a major power in today's world, although some of its power resources are stagnating or decreasing in comparison to the US and rising China. To compensate for weaknesses Russia is using both traditional and nontraditional capabilities of international influence.

Abundant academic research has shown evidence of the growing polarization across the globe both in general and in terms of affective polarization. Previous research on this topic primarily employed reactive research methods like surveys or experiments, which however do not allow researchers to observe the behavior of the units of analysis in a natural setting. Presents an alternative approach that involves analyzing the observed behavior of social media users and identifying the key polarizing cleavages through the study of hate speech with respect to distinct target groups. We present a novel coding schema for textual data, which includes two components: first, an operationalized definition of hate speech as a phenomenon with at least one of the three elements - insult, discrimination, or aggression; and second, an original coding guide for human coders annotating the use of hate speech. We apply our approach to the analysis of empirical data that includes over 5000 posts on the social media platform VK about the meetings between the Presidents of Russia and Belarus in 2020-2021. After coding the collected data, we performed the empirical analysis that identified two generic cleavages. One is about domestic politics in Belarus and Russia, whereas the other is related to the opposition between these two countries on the one hand, and Western countries on the other. We also found an additional Russian/Belarusian cleavage that is peculiar to the collected dataset. Our methodology also allowed us to identify and analyze the dynamics of macro-groups that were targets of hate speech. Importantly, these results - as any other dynamic aspect of analysis - would be highly challenging in research based on reactive methods. Thereby our results highlight the prospects of applying the proposed methodology to a broad range of textual data, as well as the benefits of exploratory analysis that helps overcome the limitations of survey instruments.

This work represents the views of the prominent Russian political scientists about the past and the future of Politeia. O.Gaman-Golutvina identifies several dimensions that together, from her point of view, define the face of Politeia and allow the journal to fulfill the mission of a development institution. A.Melville pays attention to the continuity and dynamics in the development of the journal and outlines a number of promising directions for its future. According to B.Makarenko, the main distinguishing feature of Politeia is that it has always been a community rather than just a journal. M.Ilyin draws attention to the meaning of the word πολιτεία, which became the title of the journal, suggesting that it is this title that turned into a compass that allowed the journal to simultaneously focus on political philosophy and sociology of politics. R.Turovsky views Politeia as a mirror of the contemporary Russian politics and its evolution rather than just one of the leading Political Science journals in Russia. According to A.Akhremenko, the key feature of Politeia that sets it apart from other journals is a sense of balance, an equilibrium at the intersection of methods, problems and meanings. F.Aleskerov talks about Politeia's platform for publishing works on mathematical modeling in politics as one of the journal's advantages and delineates several thematic blocks within this area, which, in his opinion, should appear on the pages of the journal. O.Malinova draws attention to Salmin Award, established in 2005 in memory of A.Salmin, the journal's founder, considering this award one of the traditions that contributes to the development of the Russian professional community of political scientists.